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Abstract 
Recent inabilities to find an escape point from the global crisis has demonstrated that 
multilateral institutions cannot fulfill the functions expected from them anymore. In this respect, 
the policies to be adopted by democratic countries are thought to be essential in the escape from 
global turmoil and crisis. Therefore, the objective of this study is to measure the effects of 
institutional and socioeconomic variables on economic growth with regard to the significance 
of political regime types or democracy, within a government.  Thus, 85 countries in four types 
of political regimes were included in the analysis by the period of 1984-2015. As a result, it has 
been acknowledged that multilateral institutions, which have been ineffective in producing a 
solution, should be reassessed within the context of recent global developments, these 
assessments should be performed by countries within the framework of their tendencies towards 
democratization and developing their sociocultural infrastructures. 
Key Words: Globalization, global turmoil, multilateralism, democracy and economic growth, 
political regimes.  
Jel Code: O43, C33. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of multilateral agreements and organizations in world politics has been changing and 
developing rapidly in the context of globalization.1 A surge of nationalist sentiment, uncovered 
in recent political processes in parts of the world, has laid bare deep cracks in the very 
foundations of the international systems and its two major pillars - globalization and 
multilateralism.2 At the root of this destabilization of the global institutional system have been 
several trends ranging from economic crises to deep-rooted imbalances that require solutions 
at global, regional and national levels.3  
New global systems resulting from national and international changes and developments 
brought along by globalization and policies adopted by countries to preserve their powers 
within the global system push the solutions that can be produced by multilateral institutions for 
regional and global problems of health, environment, security, economy, and culture into the 
background. This causes multilateral institutions to be ineffective in meeting the requirements 
of globalization, fail to fulfill the basic functions expected from them and have lower success 
levels, and thus, leads the aspects about multilateral institutions to be re-debated within the 
context of globalization. 
In the study, after analyzing the importance of multilateral institutions and global cooperation 
in solving the problems caused by globalization, the role of democracy in escaping global 
turmoil formed within the scope of global changes will be analyzed in terms of classifications 
under the regime of democracy, and the role of the social and economic determinants of 
economic growth in policymaking within economic globalization will be put forward with 
regards to political orders.  
                                                          
1
 Hellsten 2006, 422.  
2
 ECOSOC 2016. 
3
 Ibid, 1. 
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2. The Concept of Multilateralism within the Framework of Its Relations with 
Globalization, Its Significance and Its Functions 
 
2.1. The Concept of Multilateralism and Cases Threatening Multilateralism 
While several concepts in contrast to multilateralism are debated in parallel with social, 
economic, and cultural national/international changes brought by globalization such as 
unilateralism and bilateralism, multilateralism is generally defined as an institutional form 
which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalized" principles 
of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without 
regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific occurrence.4 
The values and institutions of multilateralism are not ahistorical phenomena; as they are created 
and maintained in the context of specific demands and challenges, and through specific forms 
of leadership, norms, and international power configurations, all of these factors evolve and 
change and multilateralism is destined to evolve as a function of changing environmental 
dynamics and demands.5 As a result of this, the relationship between the distribution of power, 
the nature of challenges and problems, and the international institutions that emerge to deal 
with collective challenges is constantly in flux.6 
Even though it is regarded to be natural that the values related to multilateralism make progress 
parallel to the economic and social national/international order and globalization in constant 
flux and development, multilateralism bears a meaning beyond being an international order 
especially for European countries. As a matter of fact, multilateralism is seen as a way of life 
rather than as a question of power, international order or structural change because it is the 
                                                          
4
 Ruggie 1992. 
5
 Newman, Thakur, and Tirman 2006, 1.  
6
 Ibid, 1. 
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means by which Europeans have tried, with a considerable degree of success, to reconcile 
togetherness and diversity.7 
Several factors affect the efficiency of and expectations from the contemporary forms of 
multilateralism:8 
 The relationship between the distribution of power at the international level -in all its 
dimensions, hard and soft- and the nature of multilateralism is fundamental. 
 Many of the challenges confronting multilateral institutions have been associated with 
US military and economic preeminence in a unipolar world, and an attendant pattern of 
US unilateralism. Multilateral institutions are inherently vulnerable to 
hegemonic/unilateralist power, demonstrated vividly during the UN Security Council’s 
failure to constrain the US misadventure in Iraq.  
 In some other cases, factors confronting multilateralism stem from not the distribution 
of power within inter-state relations or policies adopted by a country/countries, but 
challenges caused by structural and normative changes since the forming of multilateral 
institutions following the Second World War (to illustrate, security problems having 
increasingly become a non-state issue).  
 Although international organizations emerged from the need to regulate and give 
predictability to a narrow range of inter-state relations, in their decision-making 
procedures and their representation, many international organizations do not meet 
contemporary standards and expectations of legitimacy based upon accountability and 
democracy.  
 Existing multilateral arrangements are unable to guide states to a workable framework 
of how to deal with egregious and widespread abuses of human rights and civil war. 
                                                          
7
 Groom 460, 2006.  
8
 Newman, Thakur and Tirman 2006, 2-4. 
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 The state-centric nature of multilateralism and states’ ways of making and adopting 
decisions are inefficient in addressing many of these challenges.  
 There are policy (and knowledge) failures, such as the World Bank’s imposition of 
structural adjustment policies which have been associated with negative social 
consequences.  
 
2.2. Multilateralism and Globalization 
Changes and developments having come to life within the scope of globalization in the 
development process of multilateralism shook the belief for multilateralism especially during 
the early 21st century, which continues to dwindle to this day due to the current global turmoil. 
Therefore, this inter-state structure which defines multilateralism fails to solve today’s 
problems.  
While globalization is regarded to be a threat for the future of multilateralism, it should not be 
ignored that multilateral institutions can play a vital role in producing solutions to the global 
problems brought about by global developments such as migration, drought, terrorism 
incidents, epidemics, and poverty. Accordingly, multilateral organizations are the best tool we 
have to transform globalization into prosperity.9  
The importance of multilateralism and multilateral organizations in solving the problems 
caused by globalization is seen in Figure 1. In the figure, the functionality of organizations with 
regard to qualities such as efficiency, transparency, and encouragement are presented in terms 
of USA global fund, average bilateral, average multilateral, and average overall. It can be 
clearly seen here that the multilateral organizations have significantly higher performance 
levels on average especially compared to bilateral organizations and, in terms of almost every 
criterion, all the organizations found in the figure. 
                                                          
9
 The Wilson Center 2007. 
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Figure 1. The Importance of Multilateral Institutions 
Source: A. Glassman, 2012. ‘GHI 2013 and the Rise of Multilateralism’. Retrieved 
05.12.2018, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/ghi-2013-and-rise-multilateralism. 
Although multilateral organizations have recently focused themselves on finding solutions 
especially for global health problems, there are a number of multilateral organizations that 
function in terms of various other issues. The most commonly known among these are 
institutions like the European Union, the OECD, the World Bank and the UNESCO, while there 
are also several multilateral organizations found within the global organizations,10 Americas, 
Asia, and Middle East/Africa categorizations.11 Although the number of such organizations is 
extremely high in our day, how much they succeed in fulfilling their purposes is debatable.  
On the grounds that the inability of multilateralism to function as desired causes global turmoil 
to gradually increase, multilateralism should be readdressed in terms of its different aspects for 
                                                          
10
 Global organizations: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Union, Greenpeace International, 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Fund for International Development, Southern African 
Renewable Energy Information Network (SAREIN), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization (UNESCO). 
11
 For detailed information, see Saenz, 2016. 
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such functions to be fulfilled. In order for multilateralism to have a future and to be a useful 
force in guiding the world economy towards social justice, there is a need to take account of 
our global rights and responsibilities seriously and equally.12 States need to take control over 
the various trends of globalization by adding a social dimension to economic trends and this 
entails that regionalism is used for balancing the interests of different regions and bringing in 
the different concerns on the international negotiating table.13 If we can bring ethical debate on 
values back on the agenda of international politics, multilateral arrangements can play an 
important role in controlling the negative effects of globalization and also to take into account 
the social dimensions of globalization. 14  In addition to these, the process of innovative 
multilateralism cannot succeed without addressing the issues of security both at the regional 
and global level.15  
On the other hand, as in the areas of social and economic welfare and humanitarianism, non-
state actors are an essential component of multilateralism which must be embraced fully, 
multilateral institutions must recognize and involve non-state actors on the basis of criteria 
which ensure their legitimacy and effectiveness.16 In this sense, the multilateralism of the 
twenty-first century must not be confined to relationship amongst states; it must reflect the 
plurality of international relations and the key role of non-state actors.17   
3. The Importance of Economy and Democracy in the Cycle of Globalization 
and Global Turmoil 
3.1. The Link between Globalization and Global Turmoil 
Interactions between the momentum of historical events, the limit of the capabilities we use to 
shape the world, the ever-increasing financial needs, and moral ambiguities produce new 
                                                          
12
 Hellsten 2006, 438. 
13
 Hellsten 2006, 438. 
14
 Hellsten 2006, 438. 
15
 Telò 2013, 7.  
16
 Newman and Thakur 2006, 539.  
17
 Newman and Thakur 2006, 539. 
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developments that we cannot control, and are the momentum of the changes that shape the 
future and gradually increase on the basis of societies’ needs and in addition to this, since the 
humankind wants to organize itself as a global society, the world politics go out of control, and 
mass political confusions and philosophical complexities appear on the basis of both 
international relations and national social needs as a result of these tendencies.18   
Countries heavily dependent on the global economy are likely to experience higher economic 
growth, greater affluence, more democracy and increasingly peaceful conditions at home and 
abroad19 but globalization may sometimes be a threat, not an opportunity. Thusly, the most 
distinct characteristic of contemporary history has been its instability due to the changes caused 
by globalization.20 One of the most basic indicators supporting this is that the United States of 
America appears to be the single global power but does not have the infrastructure to maintain 
this. However, in spite of the globalization upheaval, a key independent variable of international 
relations remains constant – power and this case demonstrates that power remains the key 
independent variable shaping modern international relations.21 
In this atmosphere in which the USA has the power, traditional politics turn into international 
politics and the differences between national and international politics disappear as a result of 
modern communication and mutual economic dependencies; however, the inability of the USA 
to provide an efficient global authority within these politics due to its shortcomings caused by 
global factors, in spite of its economic power and managing a global process of political 
procedures, can lead to intensified instability in global terms.22 
Within the framework of the developments caused by the aforementioned reasons, trying to 
dominate the world and be the leader in policy determination on the part of the USA, changes 
occurring throughout the world following the September 11 attacks, the relationships of 
                                                          
18
 Z. Brzezinksi, Out of control: global turmoil on the eve of the 21st century (New York: Touchstone, 1995) xiii-xiv. 
19
 Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999.  
20
 Brzezinski, x. 
21
 Kay 2004.  
22
 Brzezinski, xiii. 
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countries with the USA in parallel with their domestic politics and dynamics, wars of power 
waged among nations and their all kinds of efforts to have a part in the world economy in order 
to obtain resources with the aim of enriching their economies all leave traces of differentiation 
observed in the balances of power with each passing day and thus, leads to global turmoil. 
On the other hand, expectations and desires of today’s societies and people also strengthen the 
atmosphere of global turmoil. Since the main purpose of people of our day, apart from the 
wealthy western countries, is not significant consumption but survival, these unusual tendencies 
hinder a global reconciliation and enhance the dangers of global segregation.23 
Social and individual demands, including multilateralism, should be reassessed on a conceptual 
basis due to several factors caused by global turmoil. Firstly, there is a need for a new definition 
of political existence that is more extensive and globally relatable, which is actually mutual 
solidarity among people, for which it is necessary to create a constant balance between social 
needs and individual satisfaction, global poverty and national wealth, natural heritages that have 
to be preserved by humans, and creating a safe environment for people.24 At this very juncture, 
the importance of reassessing multilateralism within the framework of new impressions and 
demands resulting from these factors and global turmoil becomes clear.  
Unlike previous eras, the contemporary international system contains no major contests of 
territory or ideology among the major powers; but at the same time, new threats such as 
terrorism, disease, climate change and the spread of weapons of mass destruction gives all the 
major powers a stake in maintaining stability and spreading peace and security.25 This both 
causes the countries that have a say or want to have a say in the world economy and politics to 
adopt policies accordingly and reveals the importance of international institutions and 
                                                          
23
 Brzezinski, xii. 
24
 Brzezinski, xiv. 
25
 Lennon and Kozlowski 2008, vii.  
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organizations in policymaking. Global cooperation under these conditions is both a unique 
opportunity and an imperative.26 
 
3.2. The Effects of Economy and Democracy on Global Turmoil 
The shortcomings of international organizations in terms of governance and accountability, the 
speed of economic globalization surpassing the developmental speed of political institutions 
needed to manage the process properly, political responses needing to be produced on a global 
scale but instead given on a national scale, and the inefficiency of the current international 
organizations and institutional regulations in taking precautions to prevent global crisis provide 
a unique opportunity to make a reform in the field of global economy management with a view 
to revealing the inefficiencies of current regulations in financial and economic crisis and 
proving the need for cooperation and coordination to fight the crisis.27 
Since the problems related to issues such as health, terror, environment, natural resources etc. 
created by globalization cause global turmoil in humane and geopolitical terms, the solutions 
for these problems should be global. In this regard, powerful joint movements and cooperation 
should be performed on a global scale to fulfill mutual purposes, determine the conditions of 
use of especially regional and global public goods properly, and attain the great goals agreed in 
the United Nations summits and conferences in the last twenty years.28  
In parallel with this view, Brzezinski sees the way out of the global turmoil and crisis in 
providing global cooperation among countries in an intercontinental system.29 However, what 
kind of criteria should be held in forming such an intercontinental system is ambiguous; this 
actually goes to show that powerful countries want to form all the systems planned in our day 
                                                          
26
 Ibid, vii. 
27
 J. E. Stiglitz, The Stiglitz Report: Reforming The International Monetary and Financial Systems In The Wake of The Global Crisis (New 
York-Londan: The New Press, 2010) 121-122-194-196.  
28
 Ibid, 122-123. 
29
 Newtimes.az, 24 April 2013, Global Chaos Threat.  
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to seek after methods that can provide their own strategic interests, gives the impression that 
these countries do not have a model regarding a just solution for regional disputes.30 
Since people live in a highly globalized world economy in our day, there is a mainstream 
thought that a greater international economy and financial connections can improve 
democracy.31 Indeed, in spite of the thought that the current democracy regimes have been 
unable to solve the problems created by globalization, the inverse idea that globalization can 
help consolidate democracy supports this assessment.32 This idea stems from the thought that 
the international trade increasing due to globalism will decrease balance taxes, the decreased 
taxes will make it more possible for democracy to be adopted, and class conflicts between elites 
and citizens will be less intense in more globalized countries.33  
The concept of globalization is a dialectical one by its very nature, politico-economic and socio-
cultural counter-tendencies.34 There are views that democracy increases GDP by encouraging 
investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving the provision of 
public goods, and reducing social unrest. 35  Indeed, wealthy nations tend to be more 
democratic.36 
Based on these views and assessments, the objective of the study has been determined as 
investigating what kind of effects democracy has on long-term economic growth within the 
context of social and economic factors affecting GDP. At this juncture, the study will be 
performed by classifying countries according to their democracy status (political regimes), and 
a course will be set regarding democracy-economic growth- socioeconomic variables-
globalization with regard to these country groups.  
 
                                                          
30
 Ibid.  
31
 D.Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 358.  
32
 Ibid, 334. 
33
 Ibid, 334. 
34
 Gill 1997, 5.  
35
 Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson 2016. 
36
 Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006:334. 
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3.3. Literature Review on the Relation between Democracy/Political Regimes and 
Economic Growth 
Numerous studies have up to now tried to put forward the effects of democracy on economic 
growth with regard to political regimes. The literature on the regime type and economic 
performance is presented in Table 1 in terms of samples, time periods and results.  
Table 1. Literature on Political Regimes and Economic Growth 
Author Sample Time Frame Finding 
Przeworski 
(1966)37 57 Countries 1949-1963 
Dictatorship at medium 
development level grew fastest 
Dick (1974)38 59 Underdeveloped Countries 1959-1968 
Democracies develop slightly 
faster 
Huntington and 
Dominguez 
(1975)39 
35 Underdeveloped 
Countries the 1950s Authoritarian grew faster 
Berg-Schlosser 
(1984)40 36 African Countries 1960-1975 
There are real differences among 
regime types, the pattern of these 
differences depends on the 
particular measure of economic 
progress examined 
Landau (1986)41 65 Countries 1960­1980 Authoritarian grew faster 
Sloan and 
Tedin (1987)42 
20 Latin American 
Countries 1960­1979 
Bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes do better than 
democracy; traditional 
dictatorships do worse 
Barro (1989)43 72 Countries 1960­1985 Democracies grew faster 
Grier and 
Tullock (1989)44 59 Countries 1961­1980 
Democracy in Africa and Latin 
America better, no regime 
difference in Asia country 
Remmer (1990)45 11 Latin American Countries 
1982­1988 
 
Democracies grew faster 
Helliwell 
(1992)46 125 Countries 1960-1985 
The effects of democracy on 
growth are found positive 
Mulligan, Gil and 
Sala-I-Martin 
(2004)47 
102 Countries 1960-1990 
A number of policies and 
redistribution policies, such as 
state social security expenditures, 
                                                          
37
 A. Przeworski, Party system and economic development (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University, 1966). 
38
 Dick, 1974. 
39
 Huntington and Dominguez 1975, 98-114. 
40
 Berg-Schlosser 1984. 
41
 Landau 1986. 
42
 Sloan and Tedin 1987. 
43
 Barro 1989. 
44
 Grier and Tullock 1989. 
45
 Remmer 1990. 
46
 J. F. Helliwell, ‘Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
Series (1992), No. 4066. https://doi.org/10.3386/w4066. 
47
 Mulligan, Gil and X. Sala-i-Martin 2004.  
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do not differ between 
democracies and dictatorship. 
Persson and 
Tabellini (2007)48 
123 Democratic 
Countries 
70 Autocratic 
Countries 
1960-2000 
The positive effect of transitions 
to democracy appears larger in 
absolute value (and in one case 
statistically significant) than the 
negative effect of transitions to 
autocracy. 
Jamali et al. 
(2007)49 92 and 58 countries 1990-1999 
Democracies and bureaucracies 
significantly outperform 
autocracies. 
 
 
4. Estimation Methods 
 
4.1. Cross Section Dependency Tests 
The methods used to test cross-section dependency on panel data sets are the Breusch-Pagan 
(1980)50 CDLM1 test, the Pesaran (2004)51 CDLM2 test, and the Pesaran et al. (2008)52 Bias 
Adjusted CD test.  
H0: No cross section dependency  
H1: Cross section dependency 
When the probability values are lower than 0.05 in the results to be obtained from the Breusch-
Pagan (1980) CDLM1 test, the Pesaran (2004) CDLM2 test, and the Pesaran et al. (2008) Bias 
Adjusted CD test, H0 is rejected with a 5% significance level, and cross-section dependency is 
determined to exist among the units constituting the panel. 
1) 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀1 = 𝑇 ∑ ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗2𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1𝑁−1𝑖=1   
2) 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀2 = ( 1𝑁(𝑁−1))1 2⁄ ∑ ∑ (𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑗2 − 1)𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1𝑁−1𝑖=1   
                                                          
48
 Persson and Tabellini 2007. 
49
 Jamali, Wandschneider and Wunnava 2007. 
50
 Breusch and Pagan 1980. 
51
 Pesaran 2004.. 
52
 Pesaran, Ullah and Yamagata 2008. 
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3) 𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = ( 2𝑁(𝑁−1))1 2⁄ ∑ ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗2𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1𝑁−1𝑖=1 (𝑇−𝐾−1)?̂?𝑖𝑗−?̂?𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑇𝑖𝑗 ~𝑁(0,1)  
 ?̂?𝑖𝑗, ?̂?𝑇𝑖𝑗, and 𝑣𝑇𝑖𝑗 represent the estimates of cross section dependencies among the residuals, 
the mean, and the variance respectively. The 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀1 and 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀2 tests are used when T>N, and 
the 𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 test is used when N>T. 
 
4.2. Testing the Homogeneity of Cointegration Coefficients 
In this test;  
4) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Whether the 𝛽𝑖  slope coefficients are different among the cross sections in a general 
cointegration equation as shown in D4 is tested. The hypotheses of the test are: 
H0: 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 slope coefficients are homogeneous. 
H1: 𝛽𝑖 ≠ 𝛽 slope coefficients are not homogeneous. 
Pesaran and Yamagata (2008)53 developed two different test statistics to test the hypotheses. 
5) For large samples:  ∆̂= √𝑁 𝑁−1?̃?−𝑘√2𝑘  
6) For small samples:  ∆̂𝑎𝑑𝑗= √𝑁 𝑁−1?̃?−𝑘√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡,𝑘)  
Here, N, S, k, and Var(t,k) represent the cross section number, Swamy test statistics, the 
explanatory variable number, and standard error respectively. The H0 hypothesis is rejected on 
a related significance level when the probability value is lower than 0.05, and the H1 hypothesis 
is accepted. Thus, the cointegration coefficients are acknowledged to be non-homogeneous.54  
                                                          
53
 Pesaran and Yamagata 2008. 
54
 Ibid. 
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4.3. Hadri-Kruzomi Unit Root Test 
The Hadri-Kruzomi (2012)55 test is the result of adapting the KPSS test in a time series as a 
second generation panel unit root test regarding cross-section dependency. Firstly, the 
following model is estimated: 
7) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡′𝛿𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   𝜀𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖1𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + ⋯ + ∅𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
Based on these equations, the Hadri-Kruzomi test statistics are calculated as follows; 
8) 𝑍𝐴𝑆𝑃𝐶 = 1?̂?İ𝑆𝑃𝐶2 𝑇2 ∑ (𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑊)2𝑇𝑡=1   
9) 𝑍𝐴𝐿𝐴 = 1?̂?İ𝐿𝐴2 𝑇2 ∑ (𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑊)2𝑇𝑡=1    
The null and alternative hypotheses of the Hadri-Kruzomi test are as follows; 𝐻0: ∅𝑖 ≠ 0; the series are non-stationary 𝐻0: ∅𝑖 = 0; the series are stationary 
 
4.4. Durbin-Hausman Panel Cointegration Test 
The cointegration relationship between the series in this study was analyzed with the Durbin-
Hausman panel cointegration test developed by Westerlund (2008).56 The Durbin-Hausman 
panel cointegration test provides an opportunity to perform a cointegration analysis when the 
independent variables are I(1) or I(0) and the dependent variables are I(1) and takes into account 
mutual factors.57 In the Durbin-Hausman method, Westerlund (2008) examined the existence 
of the cointegration relationship with two different tests, the first of which is the Durbin-
Hausman panel test and the second of which is the Durbin-Hausman group test. Westerlund 
(2008) enables the autoregressive parameters to differentiate among the sections in the Durbin-
Hausman group test. The hypotheses of this test are as follows; H0: No cointegration; H1: 
                                                          
55
 Hadri and Kurozomi 2012. 
56
 Westerlund 2008. 
57
 Ibid. 
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Cointegration relationship among at least a few sections. In the Westerlund (2008) Durbin-
Hausman panel test, autoregressive parameters are acknowledged to be the same for all the 
sections. The hypotheses are H0: No cointegration, H1: Cointegration relationship throughout 
the whole panel. The Durbin-Hausman test statistics are calculated with; 
10) 𝐷𝐻𝑔 = ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 (∅̃𝑖 − ∅̂𝑖)2 ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡−12𝑇𝑡=2 ;  
11) 𝐷𝐻𝑝 = ?̂?𝑛(∅̃𝑖 − ∅̂𝑖)2 ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡−12𝑇𝑡=2𝑛𝑖=1 ; 
 
4.5. Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model 
For the estimations of short and long-term coefficients following the cointegration relationship, 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)58 developed the panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model, i.e., two different estimators, namely the Mean Group Estimator (MGE) and the Pooled 
Mean Group Estimator (PMGE). The mean group estimator (MGE) does not limit the 
parameters of the ARDL specification in any way and obtains long-term parameters from the 
mean of long-term parameters calculated from individual ARDL estimations. The main 
shortcoming of this estimator is that it allows specific parameters to be the same among the 
units constituting the panel. This shortcoming observed in MGE is compensated for in the 
pooled mean group estimator (PMGE). PMGE limits the long-term parameters to be the same 
among the countries constituting the panel but allows the constant, the error variance, and the 
short-term parameters to vary depending on the country. Therefore, PMGE allows the variables 
to be heterogeneous in short-term in relation to allowing them to be homogeneous in long-term. 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) stated that whether the long-term parameters are homogeneous 
could be determined by performing the Hausman test (1978)59, and accordingly recommended 
                                                          
58
 Pesaran, Shin and Smith 1999. 
59
 Hausman 1978. 
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the test. In the Hausman test, while the null hypothesis is that “the parameters are homogeneous 
in long-term”, while in the alternative hypothesis, the proposition that “the parameters are 
heterogeneous in long-term” is tested. At this juncture, PMGE is preferred if the null hypothesis 
is accepted, and MGE is preferred if the null hypothesis is rejected. In terms of the long-term 
homogeneity assumption, MGE is a consistent estimator, while PMGE is both consistent and 
effective.  
5. The Dataset and Models 
 
5.1. The Dataset   
Within the framework of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index60, four regime 
types were taken into consideration, namely authoritarian regime, hybrid regime, flawed 
democracy, and full democracy. 85 countries in total were included in the analysis, 1261 for 
authoritarian regime, 1462 for hybrid regime, 4063 for flawed democracy, and 1964 for full 
democracy, while time dimension spans the 32-year period between the years 1984 and 2015.  
The characteristics of four country groups formed according to the democracy index are as 
follows:65 
 Authoritarian regimes: In these states, state political pluralism is absent or heavily 
circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Elections, if 
they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of 
                                                          
60
 Democracy Index, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators, grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism; 
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018.) 
61
 Countries that we can find data for the authoritarian regime (the cross-sectional dimension) are Congo Dem. Rep., Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Russian Federation, Syria Arab Republic and Vietnam. 
62
 Countries that we can find data for the hybrid regime (the cross-sectional dimension) are Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Madagascar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Zambia. 
63
 Countries that we can find data for the flawed democracy regime (the cross-sectional dimension) are Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Sri Lanka, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Mexico, Mongolia, Malaysia, Namibia, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, El 
Salvador, Suriname, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, The United States and South Africa. 
64
 Countries that we can find data for the full democracy regime (the cross-sectional dimension) are Australia, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Uruguay. 
65
 Economist Intelligence Unit, 64. 
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civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the 
ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive 
censorship. There is no independent judiciary. 
 Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from 
being both free and fair. Government pressure is usually observed on opposition parties. 
Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies-in political culture, 
functioning of government and political participation. Corruption activities are common 
and the rule of law is not strong. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on 
journalists and the judiciary is not independent. 
 Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there 
are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are 
respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, 
including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels 
of political participation. 
 Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil 
liberties are respected, but which also tend to be underpinned by a political culture 
conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is 
satisfactory. Media and the judiciary are independent. There are only limited problems 
in the functioning of democracies. 
Since the variable of gross domestic product per capita growth rate is the most significant 
indicator of economic performance, it was regarded as a dependent variable. The gross domestic 
product per capita growth rate data (%), abbreviated as PDGP, was obtained from the World 
Bank for the time period of 1984-2015. The investment profile (IP) index represents the factors 
affecting the investment risk; the internal conflict index (IC) represents the political violence 
occuring within the country and the effects it has on the government; the index of external 
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conflict (EC) represents the status of being exposed to interventions from foreign countries and 
the varying degrees of non-violent external pressures (canceling diplomatic aid, trade 
limitations, regional disputes, legal sanctions etc.); the index of socioeconomic class (SC) 
represents the evaluation of socioeconomic pressures observed in the society resulting from 
limitations or dissatisfaction caused by governmental operations and the components of 
unemployment, consumer trust, and welfare; the index of corruption (CO) represents the level 
of corruption within the political structure; the index of law and order (LO) represents the 
objectivity and power of the legal system while its sub-components of regulations represent the 
effects of the legal system on the society; the index of democratic accountability (DA) 
represents a measurement of the government’s level of sensitivity for its people; lastly, the 
index of military impact on politics (MIP) represents is measurement of the intervention levels 
of military power having come to power by assignment on political will. Data related to these 
variables were obtained from the consulting firm Political Risk Services-International Country 
Risk Guide.66  
 
5.2. The Models 
In order to reassess global turmoil and multilateralism within the scope of security, economy, 
and democracy, 85 countries in total were taken into account and the institutional determinants 
of economic growth were intended to be determined under four different regime types. Within 
this framework, four models, developed by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)67 and 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 68 , 69  and derived from production function, are 
estimated. The matches are as follows: 
                                                          
66
 Political Risk Services-International Country Risk Guide Methodology (PRS-ICRG). 2014. Available at https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/prsmethodology.pdf. 
67
 Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004. 
68
 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001. 
69
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑅𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′ + 𝜀𝑖, whereas 𝑦𝑖 is income per capita in country i, the coefficient of 𝑅𝑖 (𝛼) shows the effect of institutions on income 
per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 1378). The linear model has been preferred for simplicity.  
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a) The first model for authoritarian regimes; 
(Model 1) 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
b) The second model for hybrid regimes; 
(Model 2) 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐿𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
c) The third model for flawed democracies; 
(Model 3) 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙2𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙5𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙6𝐿𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙7𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙8𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
d) The fourth model for full democracies; 
(Model 4) 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂2𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂5𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂6𝐿𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂7𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂8𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here; PDGP, IP, IC, EC, SC, CO, LO, DA, MIP, i=1,2,3,…,N, and t=1984,1985,1986,…,2015 
represent gross domestic product per capita growth rate, the index of investment profile, the 
index of internal conflict, the index of external conflict, the index of socioeconomic class, the 
index of corruption, the index of law and order, the index of democratic accountability, the 
index of military impact on politics, the dimensions of cross section i.e. countries, and time 
dimension respectively.  
 
5.3. Empirical Findings 
Descriptive statistics regarding the variables on four models constituted to determine the long-
term institutional determinants of economic performance in terms of regime type are given in 
Table 2.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Authoritarian Regime Descriptive Statistics 
  PGDP IP IC EC SC CO LO DA MIP 
 Mean 1.37 6.80 8.51 9.08 5.49 2.47 3.65 2.57 2.93 
 Median 1.74 6.92 8.75 9.92 5.50 2.48 3.95 2.93 3.00 
 Maximum 22.72 11.50 12.00 12.00 11.00 4.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 
 Minimum -14.57 1.00 0.25 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 4.94 2.06 2.24 2.26 1.85 0.70 1.09 1.06 1.63 
 Jarque-Bera 50.73 0.00 70.77 231.54 5.79 16.67 18.87 14.76 24.54 
 Probability 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 
Hybrid Regime Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 1.53 6.57 8.11 8.89 4.88 2.62 3.24 3.51 2.97 
 Median 1.94 6.50 8.50 9.50 4.81 2.33 3.00 3.79 3.00 
 Maximum 35.72 12.00 12.00 12.00 10.92 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
 Minimum -42.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 5.51 2.14 2.43 2.40 1.93 1.02 1.25 1.24 1.52 
 Jarque-Bera 4047.15 1.62 75.65 283.40 21.79 47.24 7.14 7.39 10.83 
 Probability 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 
 Observations 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
Flawed Democracy Regime Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 2.29 7.89 9.14 10.19 5.91 3.12 3.72 4.52 4.33 
 Median 2.54 8.00 9.67 10.42 6.00 3.00 4.00 4.92 5.00 
 Maximum 15.83 12.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
 Minimum -30.71 2.67 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 3.85 2.21 2.30 1.66 1.62 1.02 1.30 1.12 1.43 
 Jarque-Bera 5289.13 32.21 631.49 1392.16 6.46 28.83 54.49 76.37 117.57 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
Full Democracy Regime Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 1.99 9.25 11.03 11.24 8.18 4.93 5.52 5.74 5.79 
 Median 2.08 9.50 11.50 11.50 8.17 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
 Maximum 25.64 12.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
 Minimum -11.40 4.00 6.00 6.50 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.08 2.08 
 Std. Dev. 2.83 2.12 1.26 0.96 1.52 1.00 0.89 0.51 0.60 
 Jarque-Bera 2187.74 33.13 539.40 572.67 14.58 60.89 1006.37 987.34 4464.29 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 
 
The cross-section dependency test results are shown in Table 3. All the variables in four models 
through which we tried to determine the long-term institutional determinants of economic 
performance in terms of four regime types are dependent on each other in cross-sectional terms, 
i.e. there is a cross-section dependency. The optimal methods taking this into account will be 
utilized in the other parts of the analysis. 
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Table 3. Cross Section Dependency Test Results 
 
 
Authoritarian 
Regime Hybrid Regime 
Flawed 
Democracy 
Regime 
Full Democracy 
Regime 
  First Model Second Model Third Model Fourth Model 
  CD Tests Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. 
gdp 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 106.29*** 0.00 148.31*** 0.00 1166.12*** 0.00 345.05*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 3.51*** 0.00 4.25*** 0.00 9.78*** 0.00 9.41*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -2.81*** 0.00 -1.28* 0.10 -2.08*** 0.02 -1.90** 0.03 
Bias-adjusted CD test 1.46* 0.07 1.65** 0.05 6.92*** 0.00 -0.62 0.73 
ip 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 133.22*** 0.00 236.23*** 0.00 1819.88*** 0.00 447.59*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 5.85*** 0.00 10.77*** 0.00 26.33*** 0.00 14.96*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -2.99*** 0.00 -3.51*** 0.00 -3.43*** 0.00 -3.59*** 0.00 
Bias-adjusted CD test 11.23*** 0.00 2.92*** 0.00 27.85*** 0.00 1.26* 0.10 
ic 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 133.03*** 0.00 200.92*** 0.00 1758.20*** 0.00 487.31*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 5.83*** 0.00 8.15*** 0.00 24.77*** 0.00 17.10*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -3.56*** 0.00 -3.32*** 0.00 -1.44* 0.08 -0.88 0.19 
Bias-adjusted CD test 13.63*** 0.00 2.57*** 0.01 50.69*** 0.00 0.62 0.27 
ec 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 133.03*** 0.00 157.72*** 0.00 1639.98*** 0.00 349.67*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 5.83*** 0.00 4.95*** 0.00 21.77*** 0.00 9.66*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -3.56*** 0.00 -2.39*** 0.01 -1.78*** 0.04 -1.96** 0.03 
Bias-adjusted CD test 13.63*** 0.00 12.00*** 0.00 17.49*** 0.00 3.97*** 0.00 
sc 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 155.99*** 0.00 163.62*** 0.00 1341.36*** 0.00 233.72*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 7.83*** 0.00 5.38*** 0.00 14.21*** 0.00 3.39*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -2.90*** 0.00 -2.80*** 0.00 -3.05*** 0.00 -3.19*** 0.00 
Bias-adjusted CD test 21.17*** 0.00 5.08*** 0.00 32.93*** 0.00 2.86*** 0.00 
co 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 184.98*** 0.00 193.98*** 0.00 1521.55*** 0.00 537.17*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 10.36*** 0.00 7.63*** 0.00 18.78*** 0.00 19.80*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -3.25*** 0.00 -3.50*** 0.00 -2.60*** 0.01 -1.71** 0.04 
Bias-adjusted CD test 7.56*** 0.00 6.51*** 0.00 33.13*** 0.00 11.60*** 0.00 
lo 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 146.83*** 0.00 191.41*** 0.00 1958.70*** 0.00 321.50*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 7.04*** 0.00 7.44*** 0.00 29.84*** 0.00 8.14*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -3.55*** 0.00 -2.92*** 0.00 -2.79*** 0.00 -1.70** 0.04 
Bias-adjusted CD test 20.77*** 0.00 3.07*** 0.00 55.99*** 0.00 2.07** 0.02 
da 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 161.83*** 0.00 152.59*** 0.00 1452.90*** 0.00 272.87*** 0.00 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 8.34*** 0.00 4.57*** 0.00 17.04*** 0.00 5.51*** 0.00 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -2.84*** 0.00 -3.43*** 0.00 -3.06*** 0.00 -1.99** 0.02 
Bias-adjusted CD test 15.52*** 0.00 6.59*** 0.00 24.62*** 0.00 1.40* 0.08 
mip 
cd Lm1 (Breusch,Pagan 1980) 260.06*** 0.00 175.24*** 0.00 1202.46*** 0.00 208.54** 0.03 
cd LM2 (Pesaran 2004 CDlm) 16.89*** 0.00 6.24*** 0.00 10.70*** 0.00 2.03** 0.02 
cd LM  (Pesaran 2004 CD) -2.69*** 0.00 -2.93*** 0.00 -2.46*** 0.01 -1.09 0.14 
Bias-adjusted CD test 47.57*** 0.00 6.36*** 0.00 52.99*** 0.00 -1.00 0.84 
***
, 
**
 and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Whether the long-term parameters were homogeneous was analyzed through the Delta Test 
developed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), the results of which are given in Table 4. In the 
results obtained regarding four models in terms of four different regime types, the null 
hypothesis was rejected while the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Thus, it was concluded 
that the slope coefficients were heterogeneous.  
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Table 4. Delta Test Statistics 
 
Authoritarian 
Regime Hybrid Regime 
Flawed Democracy 
Regime 
Full Democracy 
Regime 
 First Model Second Model Third Model Fourth Model 
 Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. 
Delta_tilde: 2.01** 0.02 2.66*** 0.00 7.38*** 0.00 1.54* 0.06 
Delta_tilde_adj: 2.41*** 0.01 3.19*** 0.00 8.83*** 0.00 1.86** 0.03 
 N=12 N=14 N=40 N=19 
***
, 
**
 and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
The Hadri-Kruzomi unit root test results are shown in Table 5a. The null hypothesis could not 
be rejected according to the ZA_la statistics in the first three models and ZA_spac statistics in 
the fourth model for the GDP variable. Consequently, the GDP variable which is a dependent 
variable of all four models includes unit root. The condition for the dependent variable to 
include first-order unit root (I (1)) was met for the Durbin-Hausman cointegration test and the 
panel ARDL used to determine the long-term cointegration coefficients. Appendix 2 (A2) 
presents the results of first-order differences. 
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Table 5a. Hadri-Kruzomi Unit Root Test Results 
Authoritarian Regime Hadri-Kruzomi (2012) Unit Root Test Results Hybrid Regime Hadri-Kruzomi (2012) Unit Root Test Results 
First Model Second Model 
   Level, Constant Level, Constant +trend    Level, Constant Level, Constant +trend 
   Test Stat. Prob. Test Stat. Prob.    Test Stat. Prob. Test Stat. Prob. 
GDP  ZA_spac 3.15*** 0.00 -0.10 0.54 GDP  ZA_spac 3.94*** 0.00 27.67*** 0.00 
  ZA_la 0.55 0.29 1.02 0.15   ZA_la -0.09 0.54 5.98*** 0.00 
IP  ZA_spac -1.19 0.88 0.01 0.50 IP  ZA_spac -3.16 1.00 -3.11 1.00 
  ZA_la -1.34 0.91 1.11 0.13   ZA_la -3.53 1.00 -3.92 1.00 
IC  ZA_spac 0.24 0.40 -1.07 0.86 IC  ZA_spac -1.35 0.91 -2.24 0.99 
  ZA_la 0.02 0.49 -1.49 0.93   ZA_la -2.45 0.99 -4.16 1.00 
EC  ZA_spac 0.24 0.40 -1.07 0.86 EC  ZA_spac 0.10 0.46 -0.74 0.77 
  ZA_la 0.02 0.49 -1.49 0.93   ZA_la -1.99 0.98 -3.87 1.00 
SC  ZA_spac 0.00 0.50 -1.08 0.86 SC  ZA_spac -0.33 0.63 -0.83 0.80 
  ZA_la -0.12 0.55 -2.03 0.98   ZA_la -2.22 0.99 -3.37 1.00 
CO  ZA_spac -0.59 0.72 -1.31 0.91 CO  ZA_spac -1.07 0.86 -0.48 0.69 
  ZA_la -0.17 0.57 -0.63 0.74   ZA_la -1.46 0.93 -0.62 0.73 
LO  ZA_spac -1.20 0.88 -2.14 0.98 LO  ZA_spac 0.12 0.45 -0.58 0.72 
  ZA_la -1.17 0.88 -0.52 0.70   ZA_la 2.57*** 0.01 -0.55 0.71 
DA  ZA_spac -0.09 0.54 -1.02 0.85 DA  ZA_spac -2.70 1.00 -1.72 0.96 
  ZA_la 2.20*** 0.01 0.10 0.46   ZA_la -3.30 1.00 -3.70 1.00 
MIP  ZA_spac -0.12 0.55 0.51 0.30 MIP  ZA_spac 0.19 0.42 1.18 0.12 
  ZA_la -0.41 0.66 0.31 0.38   ZA_la -2.55 0.99 -3.02 1.00 
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Table 5a. Hadri-Kruzomi Unit Root Test Results 
 
 
Flawed Democracy Regime Hadri-Kruzomi (2012) Unit Root Test Results Full Democracy Regime Hadri-Kruzomi (2012) Unit Root Test Results 
Third Model Fourth Model 
   Level, Constant Level, Constant +trend    Level, Constant Level, Constant +trend 
   Test Stat. Prob. Test Stat. Prob.    Test Stat. Prob. Test Stat. Prob. 
GDP  ZA_spac 2.51*** 0.01 3.90*** 0.00 GDP  ZA_spac -0.72 0.76 -2.20 0.99 
  ZA_la 1.15 0.14 1.08 0.16   ZA_la 1.44* 0.08 71.28*** 0.00 
IP  ZA_spac -4.23 1.00 8.30*** 0.00 IP  ZA_spac -1.87 0.97 -0.24 0.59 
  ZA_la -4.86 1.00 4.74*** 0.00   ZA_la -2.44 0.99 -0.46 0.68 
IC  ZA_spac -1.05 0.85 -2.20 0.99 IC  ZA_spac 0.38 0.35 -1.34 0.91 
  ZA_la -1.32 0.91 -3.14 1.00   ZA_la 1.14 0.13 -1.55 0.94 
EC  ZA_spac -0.86 0.81 -1.66 0.95 EC  ZA_spac -2.57 0.99 -2.69 1.00 
  ZA_la 2.50*** 0.01 -1.64 0.95   ZA_la -3.40 1.00 -3.93 1.00 
SC  ZA_spac -1.01 0.84 11.60*** 0.00 SC  ZA_spac -2.38 0.99 -3.30 1.00 
  ZA_la -1.08 0.86 11.30*** 0.00   ZA_la -3.06 1.00 -4.61 1.00 
CO  ZA_spac -2.84 1.00 25.19*** 0.00 CO  ZA_spac -0.74 0.77 -0.40 0.66 
  ZA_la -2.09 0.98 32.85*** 0.00   ZA_la -0.35 0.64 0.84 0.20 
LO  ZA_spac 2.83*** 0.00 -3.04 1.00 LO  ZA_spac 4.17*** 0.00 -1.57 0.94 
  ZA_la 4.03*** 0.00 -4.62 1.00   ZA_la -1.23 0.89 -2.70 1.00 
DA  ZA_spac -5.03 1.00 -2.91 1.00 DA  ZA_spac -2.54 0.99 0.96 0.17 
  ZA_la -5.85 1.00 -6.37 1.00   ZA_la -2.94 1.00 -0.80 0.79 
MIP  ZA_spac -2.37 0.99 -1.22 0.89 MIP  ZA_spac -1.30 0.90 2.14** 0.02 
  ZA_la -2.78 1.00 -0.02 0.51   ZA_la -0.61 0.73 4.43*** 0.00 
ZA_spc: the augmented panel KPSS test statistic with long-run variance correced by the SPC method 
ZA_la:  the augmented panel KPSS test statistic with lonsg-run variance correced by the LA method 
***
, 
**
 and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Durbin-Haussman Test Statistics 
 
Authoritarian 
Regime Hybrid Regime 
Flawed Democracy 
Regime 
Full Democracy 
Regime 
 First Model Second Model Third Model Fourth Model 
  Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. Stat. prob. 
dh_g 5.38*** 0.00 6.74*** 0.00 175.99*** 0.00 66.37*** 0.00 
dh_p 5.61*** 0.00 16.01*** 0.00 52.02*** 0.00 60.39*** 0.00 
***
, 
**
 and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The Durbin-Hausman cointegration test results are given in Table 6. According to dh_g and 
dh_p statistical results for all four models to determine the long-term institutional determinants 
of economic performance in terms of four regime types, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Accordingly, the existence of a relationship between 
GDP per capita growth rate and the variables of investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, socioeconomic class, corruption, law and order, democratic accountability, and 
military impact on politics was tested. The results indicate a long-term relationship between the 
addressed variables. 
 
5.3.1.  Authoritarian Regime Results70  
Table 7a. Authoritarian Regime Results 
  Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates     
  Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val 
Long-Run Coefficients 
ip -0.46*** 0.09 -5.32 0.11 1.99 0.05 0.08 0.77 
ic 1.10*** 0.13 8.33 -0.23 1.53 -0.15 0.76 0.38 
ec 0.09 0.11 0.83 -0.25 1.00 -0.25 0.11 0.73 
sc -1.24*** 0.17 -7.38 -2.90 1.84 -1.57 0.82 0.37 
co 0.67*** 0.11 6.27 -2.07 3.61 -0.57 0.58 0.45 
lo 0.55*** 0.10 5.45 -1.28 2.50 -0.51 0.54 0.46 
da -0.13 0.09 -1.39 0.98 0.94 1.04 1.39 0.24 
mip 0.33** 0.14 2.36 -2.84 1.65 -1.72 3.71 0.05 
      Joint Hausman test: 10.60 0.23 
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 There are  8 stochastic regressors (X) and  1 deterministic regressors (Z). The maximum number of time periods and groups are: 32 12. The 
maximum number of iterations for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation is set to: 1000. The value for the missing observations is set 
to:8934567. If there is a common factor problem, use demeaned data. The fixed lag specification (2) has been selected. All the long-run 
parameters have been restricted to be the same across groups. The dynamic fixed effects OLS have been used as initial estimate(s) of the long-
run parameter(s) for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. The Back-Substitution method has been chosed to use  which uses only the 
first derivative of the log-likelihood function. Computations converged after 56 iterations. The number of groups is N=12. Restricted log 
likelihood:-214.2068. Unrestricted log likelihood:166.4106. LR statistic testing for equal long-run parameters:761.2348. LR statistic is 
distributed as Chi-Squared with  88 degrees of freedom, and its p-value is 0.00. According to the results of the diagnostic tests, there is no 
problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model. 
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Table 7a. Authoritarian Regime Results 
Error Correction Coefficients 
Phi -0.56*** 0.17 -3.27 -0.85 0.25 -3.43 
h-test is the Hausman test statistic with its associated p-value. ***, ** and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
As a result of the Hausman test performed to test whether the variables were homogeneous in 
long term, long-term homogeneity was concluded to exist, and the effective and consistent 
Pooled Mean Group Estimator (PMG) was determined to be the optimal estimator in our first 
model under the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient of statistically significant error 
correction (phi) demonstrates that there is a long-term relationship between economic growth 
and the institutional variables and that the balance is re-converged even when it is deviated 
from.  
The pooled mean group estimator results regarding the group of countries governed by an 
authoritarian regime are shown in Table 7a. According to the related results, the variables 
except for investment profile, socioeconomic class, and democratic accountability are observed 
to have a long-term effect on economic growth. The variables that have the greatest effect in 
order are internal conflict, corruption, law and order, military impact on politics, and external 
conflict (statistically insignificant).  Especially the fact that the increase in the variable of law 
and order brings along an increase in economic growth is an expected result for this country 
group under which the underdeveloped or developing countries fall. However, the effects of 
corruption and internal conflict on economic growth is thought to result from the impact of 
factors like political violence on the government and its policies regarding the governance of 
the country and consequently the increase in economic activities through illegal methods such 
as corruption and usury due to degradation of the economic and financial environment.   
Among the variables affecting economic growth negatively in long term, the effects of the 
socioeconomic class variable are observed to be extremely higher than those of the other 
variables. This goes to show that even the improvements to occur within the socioeconomic 
structure of countries cannot increase economic growth, and it is thought to be caused by the 
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inability of such improvements to provide economic growth due to structural characteristics 
such as unimproved and disarrayed employment opportunities and limitations resulting from 
government policies. The short-term coefficients, which are observed to bear similarities to the 
long-term coefficients when analyzed, are presented in the attached Table 7b.  
5.3.2.  Hybrid Regime Results71 
Table 8a. Hybrid Regime Results 
 Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates   
  Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val 
Long-Run Coefficients 
ip -0.73 0.07 -10.84 0.08 0.81 0.10 1.03 0.31 
ic 0.05 0.08 0.65 1.30* 0.79 1.65 2.53 0.11 
ec 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.18 0.40 -0.44 0.20 0.65 
sc 0.19 0.12 1.59 0.67 0.65 1.03 0.57 0.45 
co 1.08 0.12 9.04 -0.68 0.91 -0.75 3.79 0.05 
lo 0.00 0.10 0.03 -2.56 2.42 -1.06 1.12 0.29 
da 0.02 0.08 0.23 -0.58 0.76 -0.77 0.64 0.42 
mip -0.03 0.02 -1.42 -0.29 0.20 -1.45 1.66 0.20 
      Joint Hausman test: 59.40*** 0.00 
Error Correction Coefficients   
Phi -0.95 0.15 -6.45 -1.85*** 0.20 -9.45   
h-test is the Hausman test statistic with its associated p-value. ***, ** and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
As a result of the Hausman test performed to test whether the variables were homogeneous in 
long term, long-term heterogeneity was concluded to exist, and the consistent Mean Group 
Estimator (MG) was determined to be the optimal estimator for the second model by accepting 
the alternative hypothesis under the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient of statistically 
significant error correction (phi) indicates that there is a long-term relationship between 
economic growth and the institutional variables while demonstrating that economic growth 
converges the balance in the face of a shock. 
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 There are  8 stochastic regressors (X) and  1 deterministic regressors (Z). The maximum number of time periods and groups are: 32  14. The 
maximum number of iterations for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation is set to: 1000. The value for the missing observations is set 
to:8934567. AIC (Akaike) has been used to select the lag orders for each group. All the long-run parameters have been restricted to be the 
same across groups. The static fixed effects OLS estimates have been used as initial estimate(s) of the long-run parameter(s) for the pooled 
maximum likelihood estimation. The Newton-Raphson method has been chosen to use which uses both the first and the second derivative of 
the log-likelihood function. Computations converged after 17 iterations.The number of groups is N=14. Restricted log likelihood:-689.4383. 
Unrestricted log likelihood:-341.7952. LR statistic testing for equal long-run parameters:695.2861. LR statistic is distributed as Chi-Squared 
with 104 degrees of freedom, and its p-value is 0.00. According to the results of the diagnostic tests, there is no problem of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the model. 
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The mean group estimator results regarding the group of countries governed by a hybrid regime 
are presented in Table 8a. According to the related results regarding the hybrid regime group, 
the variables of investment profile, internal conflict, and socioeconomic class have a positive 
effect on economic growth while the other variables have a negative effect. Among the 
variables having a positive effect, only the variable of internal conflict is observed to be 
statistically significant. The significant level of impact of this variable may be associated with 
the high levels of civil chaos, political violence, and due to the weak structure of civil society 
in these countries, and a weak perception of superiority of law and high corruption levels 
increasing economic activities as opposed to what would normally be expected from them.  
Among the variables having a long-term negative effect on economic growth, the variable of 
law and order is observed to have a striking impact. This stems from issues like the lack of an 
independent judiciary, an unjust system of law, and high levels of pressure from the government 
in these countries. The results regarding the variable of corruption having the most significant 
long-term negative effect following the variable of law and order may be stated to result from 
the shortcomings within the political structure and operation in these countries. The short-term 
coefficients, which are observed to bear similarities to the long-term coefficients when 
analyzed, are presented in the attached Table 8b.  
 
5.3.3.  Flawed Democracy Regime Results72    
Table 9a. Flawed Democracy Regime Results 
  Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates     
  Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val 
Long-Run Coefficients 
ip 0.23 0.03 7.70 0.47 0.34 1.38 0.51 0.48 
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 There are  8 stochastic regressors (X) and  1 deterministic regressors (Z).The maximum number of time periods and groups are: 32  40. The 
maximum number of iterations for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation is set to: 1000. The value for the missing observations is set 
to:8934567. AIC (Akaike) has been used to select the lag orders for each group. The mean group estimates have been used as initial estimate(s) 
of the long-run parameter(s) for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. The Back-Substitution method has been chosen to use which uses 
only the first derivative of the log-likelihood function. Computations converged after 26 iterations. The number of groups is N=40. Restricted 
log likelihood:-1802.6731. Unrestricted log likelihood:-323.5267. LR statistic testing for equal long-run parameters:2958.2930. LR statistic is 
distributed as Chi-Squared with 312 degrees of freedom, and its p-value is 0.00. According to the results of the diagnostic tests, there is no 
problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model. 
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Table 9a. Flawed Democracy Regime Results 
ic 0.68 0.04 16.81 -0.06 0.92 -0.06 0.64 0.42 
ec -0.27 0.05 -5.91 0.68 1.15 0.59 0.68 0.41 
sc 0.01 0.02 0.49 -0.24 0.18 -1.35 1.99 0.16 
co -0.36 0.04 -9.21 -0.03 0.74 -0.04 0.21 0.65 
lo 0.27 0.04 7.63 0.97 0.67 1.44 1.07 0.30 
da -0.08 0.04 -2.18 0.49 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.39 
mip 0.25 0.04 6.67 -0.37 0.48 -0.77 1.68 0.20 
      Joint Hausman test: 23.66 0.00 
Error Correction Coefficients   
Phi -0.60 0.07 -8.99 -1.49*** 0.14 -11.08   
 h-test is the Hausman test statistic with its associated p-value. ***, ** and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
As a result of the Hausman test performed to test whether the variables were homogeneous in 
long term, long-term heterogeneity was concluded to exist, and the consistent Mean Group 
Estimator (MG) was determined to be the optimal estimator for our third model by accepting 
the alternative hypothesis under the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient of statistically 
significant error correction (phi) indicates that there is a long-term relationship between 
economic growth and the institutional variables while demonstrating that economic growth 
converges the balance in the face of a shock. 
The mean group estimator results regarding the group of countries governed a flawed 
democracy regime are shown Table 9a. According to the related results, in the countries 
governed by a flawed democracy regime, the variables having the greatest long-term effects on 
economic growth were determined, in order, to be law and order (positive), external conflict 
(positive), democratic accountability (positive), investment profile (positive), military impact 
on politics (negative), and socioeconomic class (negative). The variables like corruption and 
internal conflict having extremely low effects may be associated with higher development 
levels of the countries in this group in terms of socioeconomic status compared to the countries 
in the authoritarian and hybrid regime groups. The variables like law and order and democratic 
accountability being among the variables that have a significant long-term effect on economic 
growth result from the idea that since these countries have such shortcomings as problems 
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concerning governance, an underdeveloped political culture, and low participation levels in 
politics, the increases in these variables will improve these shortcomings and in turn strengthen 
democracy and economic growth. The short-term coefficients, which are observed to bear 
similarities to the long-term coefficients when analyzed, are presented in Table 9a. 
 
5.3.4.  Full Democracy Regime Results73 
Table 10a. Full Democracy Regime Results 
  Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates   
  Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val 
Long-Run Coefficients 
ip 0.24*** 0.06 3.79 -2.19 1.04 -2.11 5.48 0.02 
ic 0.20** 0.08 2.38 -0.50 2.14 -0.24 0.11 0.74 
ec 0.55*** 0.07 7.55 -1.62 1.71 -0.95 1.61 0.20 
sc -0.31*** 0.07 -4.50 -0.66 1.05 -0.63 0.12 0.73 
co -0.89*** 0.12 -7.35 1.85 2.07 0.90 1.76 0.18 
lo 0.69*** 0.13 5.34 2.41 4.15 0.58 0.17 0.68 
da 1.24*** 0.13 9.72 0.67 1.94 0.35 0.09 0.77 
mip -0.03 0.04 -0.89 0.03 1.08 0.03 0.00 0.95 
       Joint Hausman test: 12.45 0.13 
Error Correction Coefficients 
Phi -0.52*** 0.11 -4.57 -0.93 0.30 -3.16 
h-test is the Hausman test statistic with its associated p-value. ***, ** and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
As a result of the Hausman test performed to test whether the variables were homogeneous in 
long term, long-term homogeneity was concluded to exist, and the effective and consistent 
Pooled Mean Group Estimator (PMG) was determined to be the optimal estimator in our fourth 
model under the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient of statistically significant error 
correction (phi) demonstrates that there is a long-term relationship between economic growth 
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 There are  8 stochastic regressors (X) and  1 deterministic regressors (Z).The maximum number of time periods and groups are: 32  19. The 
maximum number of iterations for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation is set to: 1000. The value for the missing observations is set 
to:8934567. AIC (Akaike) has been used to select the lag orders for each group. All the long-run parameters have been restricted to be the 
same across groups. The static fixed effects OLS estimates have been used as initial estimate(s) of the long-run parameter(s) for the pooled 
maximum likelihood estimation. The Newton-Raphson method has been chosen to use which uses both the first and the second derivative of 
the log-likelihood function. Computations converged after 35 iterations. The number of groups is N=19. Restricted log likelihood:-754.5851. 
Unrestricted log likelihood:-119.9025. LR statistic testing for equal long-run parameters:1269.3654. LR statistic is distributed as Chi-Squared 
with 144 degrees of freedom, and its p-value is 0.00. According to the results of the diagnostic tests, there is no problem of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the model. 
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and the institutional variables and that the balance is re-converged even when it is deviated 
from. 
The pooled mean group estimator results regarding the group of countries governed by a full 
democracy regime are presented in Table 10a. According to the results related to the full 
democracy countries, statistically significant results are observed to have been found for all the 
variables except for military impact on politics. These results demonstrate that the other regime 
types including the flawed democracy regime have problems regarding democratic governance 
while the full democracy regime have very limited problems about democracy, social and 
economic variables encourage economic growth in long term in the countries that have a 
political culture supporting democracy, and these variables have high levels of practicability as 
political tools.  
The most significant positive effects are produced by the variables of democratic accountability 
and law and order while the most significant negative effects are produced by the variable of 
corruption, which is thought to stem from the facts that the countries in this group are developed 
in terms of democratic governance and their government operation levels are satisfactory, and 
that these countries are from Europe or countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
where the social, cultural, and economic development levels are extremely high. The short-term 
coefficients, which are observed to bear similarities to the long-term coefficients when 
analyzed, are presented in Table 10b. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In spite of the view that multilateralism should play an active role in escaping global turmoil 
caused by changes and developments resulting from globalization, multilateral institutions 
cannot fulfill their basic functions due to the policies of the countries trying to be a global power 
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and in turn their inability to perceive the instability and global developments occurring within 
the global system. This necessitates that the aspects of multilateralism be reassessed within the 
framework of globalization with a view to escaping global turmoil.  
Even though the policies adopted by the USA, which is regarded as the single global power, 
have an international impact, the reason why global instability cannot be eliminated is that the 
nations wanting to become a global power do not have the necessary social and cultural 
infrastructure in addition to a strong economic and political structure. This brings along the idea 
that the policies pursued by the countries that have a strong sociocultural infrastructure and 
consequently a strong democracy will be effective in escaping global crisis and eliminating the 
instability created by global turmoil. 
Based on this idea, the long-term institutional determinants of economic growth was analyzed 
with regard to political regime types in the study, and according to the results of this analysis, 
the socioeconomic variables in the full democracy regime group comprising of developed 
countries encourage economic growth. These results stem from the fact that the countries in 
this group have a developed social, cultural, and economic infrastructure. Indeed, in these 
countries which include some of the European ones, multilateral institutions and 
multilateralism, which are thought to play an important role in solving global problems in the 
future, are regarded as an effort to get together and a lifestyle rather than an issue of power or 
an international order, and this view endorses democratization and simplifies the solutions for 
problems.  
The most effective way in escaping global crisis and turmoil is acknowledged to be the fact that 
countries should develop their socioeconomic infrastructures within the framework of their 
tendencies towards democratization due to the aforementioned reasons, and regulations should 
be performed to make the perception of multilateral institutions the same as that of the 
developed European countries which have the most democratic regime types. Indeed, 
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reassessing multilateral institutions which are unable to find a solution for today’s global issues 
by introducing a social dimension to economic tendencies within the framework of recent 
global changes, bringing ethic assessments and world democracy into the forefront, adopting 
policies that can eliminate regional inequalities, and also multilateral institutions’ performing 
meetings open to developing or underdeveloped countries’ participation are all estimated to be 
effective in eliminating the shortcomings of multilateral institutions and putting an end to the 
instability created by global turmoil in the future.   
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Appendix 
A1. Short-Run Coefficients 
Table 7b. Authoritarian Regime  
Short-Run Coefficients  
Results (PMGE) 
Table 8b. Hybrid Regime  
Short-Run Coefficients 
Results (MGE) 
Table 9b. Flawed Democracy Regime  
Short-Run Coefficients  
Results (MGE) 
Table 10b. Full Democracy Regime 
 Short-Run Coefficients  
Results (PMGE) 
  coef. st. er. t-ratio   coef. st. er. t-ratio   coef. st. er. t-ratio   coef. st. er. t-ratio 
ip -0.26*** 0.08 -3.27 ip 0.94 1.64 0.57 ip 0.74** 0.30 2.45 ip 0.12*** 0.03 4.57 
ic 0.61*** 0.19 3.27 ic 2.13 1.38 1.54 ic 0.80*** 0.31 2.62 ic 0.10*** 0.02 4.57 
ec 0.05*** 0.02 3.27 ec -0.10 0.52 -0.18 ec -0.32 0.33 -0.98 ec 0.29*** 0.06 4.57 
sc -0.69*** 0.21 -3.27 sc 0.84 1.00 0.84 sc -0.28 0.23 -1.21 sc -0.16*** 0.03 -4.57 
co 0.37*** 0.11 3.27 co -1.66 1.53 -1.08 co 0.71 0.48 1.49 co -0.46*** 0.10 -4.57 
lo 0.31*** 0.10 3.27 lo -5.94 5.57 -1.07 lo 1.79*** 0.61 2.93 lo 0.36*** 0.08 4.57 
da -0.07*** 0.02 -3.27 da -0.99 1.53 -0.65 da 0.26 0.34 0.76 da 0.64*** 0.14 4.57 
mip 0.19*** 0.06 3.27 mip -0.31 0.26 -1.17 mip -0.31 0.46 -0.69 mip -0.02*** 0.00 -4.57 
dgdp (-1) 0.14 0.09 1.62 dgdp(-1) 0.28** 0.13 2.06 dgdp (-1) 0.38*** 0.08 4.99 dgdp(-1) -0.01 0.06 -0.11 
dip -0.17 0.25 -0.67 dip -1.29 1.64 -0.79 dip -0.24 0.26 -0.95 dip -0.03 0.11 -0.26 
dip(1) 0.42*** 0.13 3.12 dip (-1) -0.11 0.37 -0.31 dip(-1) -0.11 0.19 -0.60 dip (-1) 0.01 0.09 0.11 
dic -0.23 0.37 -0.62 dic -1.22** 0.58 -2.12 dic -0.24 0.23 -1.04 dic 0.15 0.39 0.37 
dic(1) 0.04 0.38 0.11 dic (-1) -1.56 1.22 -1.27 dic(-1) -0.34*** 0.11 -3.13 dic (-1) -0.22 0.15 -1.40 
dec 0.07 0.39 0.18 dec -0.02 0.47 -0.03 dec 0.52 0.27 1.90 dec 0.12 0.13 0.97 
dec(1) -0.54 0.50 -1.08 dec (-1) -0.16 0.43 -0.39 dec(-1) 0.05 0.26 0.21 dec (-1) -0.07 0.13 -0.55 
dsc 0.87 0.54 1.62 dsc 0.75 1.49 0.50 dsc 0.15 0.20 0.77 dsc 0.58** 0.24 2.42 
dsc(1) 0.64** 0.25 2.53 dsc (-1) 0.56 1.08 0.52 dsc(-1) 0.30 0.25 1.20 dsc (-1) -0.23 0.17 -1.33 
dco -0.58* 0.33 -1.76 dco 1.61 1.50 1.08 dco -0.66* 0.35 -1.90 dco -0.18 0.29 -0.60 
dco(1) 1.90 2.03 0.93 dco (-1) -0.09 0.95 -0.10 dco(-1) -0.17 0.23 -0.73 dco (-1) -0.42* 0.24 -1.78 
dlo -2.73* 1.48 -1.84 dlo 4.17 3.44 1.21 dlo -1.04 0.66 -1.57 dlo -0.07 0.37 -0.20 
dlo(1) 0.21 0.33 0.62 dlo (-1) 1.18 1.22 0.96 dlo(-1) -0.88* 0.52 -1.68 dlo (-1) 0.62 0.64 0.98 
dda -0.05 0.57 -0.08 dda -0.02 1.14 -0.02 dda -0.18 0.19 -0.93 dda -0.70 0.53 -1.32 
dda(1) -0.44 0.58 -0.76 dda (-1) -0.09 0.50 -0.18 dda(-1) -0.22 0.18 -1.18 dda (-1) 0.27** 0.12 2.23 
dmip 2.23 1.94 1.15 dmip 0.06 0.21 0.30 dmip 0.04 0.40 0.10 dmip -0.14 0.15 -0.94 
dmip (-1) -2.62 2.47 -1.06 dmip(-1) -0.07 0.25 -0.27 dmip (-1) 0.06 0.27 0.22 dmip(-1) 0.16 0.15 1.08 
inpt -0.90 0.86 -1.05 inpt 7.14 5.49 1.30 inpt 2.81 2.66 1.05 inpt -0.32 0.60 -0.54 
***
, 
**
 and * are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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A2. Unit Root Test Results 
Table 5b. Hadri-Kruzomi Unit Root Test Results (First Difference) 
 
 
First Model Second Model Third Model 
 
Fourth Model 
 
 Cons. Cons.+trend Cons. Cons.+trend Cons. Cons.+trend Cons. Cons.+trend 
 
 
Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat. 
GDP ZA_spac 3.67*** 11.75*** 4.54*** 7.34*** 1.37* 10.99*** 0.91 0.73 
 
ZA_la 7.02*** 20.78*** 6.35*** 10.53*** 2.76*** 14.08*** 0.87 0.84 
IP ZA_spac 5.41*** 18.45*** 6.48*** 3.97*** 59.90*** 189.22*** 3.07*** 10.22*** 
 
ZA_la 5.80*** 20.36*** 14.69*** 10.81*** 69.83*** 215.82*** 3.45*** 12.48*** 
IC ZA_spac 6.39*** 13.54*** 9.89*** 13.96*** 17.54*** 71.06*** 4.57*** 16.30*** 
 
ZA_la 8.42*** 16.68*** 18.89*** 27.26*** 20.58*** 82.78*** 3.91*** 13.93*** 
EC ZA_spac 6.39*** 13.54*** 9.89*** 13.96*** 17.54*** 71.06*** 4.57*** 16.30*** 
 
ZA_la 8.42*** 16.68*** 18.89*** 27.26*** 20.58*** 82.78*** 3.91*** 13.93*** 
SC ZA_spac -0.18 4.61*** 1.86** 6.48*** 63.37*** 183.96*** 0.28 7.19*** 
 
ZA_la 0.37 6.12*** 7.96*** 16.73*** 59.00*** 180.40*** -0.01 6.79*** 
CO ZA_spac 5.23*** 24.38*** 9.00*** 22.98*** 17.82*** 60.36*** 0.10 3.37*** 
 
ZA_la 7.60*** 34.69*** 12.48*** 31.85*** 25.21*** 76.32*** -0.33 2.38*** 
LO ZA_spac -0.75 2.84*** 6.58*** 2.98*** 50.71*** 184.42*** 6.31*** 24.14*** 
 
ZA_la -0.11 4.69*** 14.24*** 7.03*** 51.11*** 193.06*** 5.12*** 21.28*** 
DA ZA_spac 7.95*** 32.73*** 4.00*** 7.84*** 14.74*** 51.59*** 0.42 7.39*** 
 
ZA_la 7.49*** 34.74*** 8.59*** 19.49*** 21.50*** 71.42*** -0.50 4.56*** 
MIP ZA_spac -2.18 -0.08 8.93*** 19.78*** 92.44*** 299.67*** 0.27 8.69*** 
 
ZA_la -2.00 0.42 16.07*** 36.63*** 98.05*** 301.45*** -0.69 5.73*** 
 
